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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine founding a company that revolutionizes the way people enjoy
professional sports.1 Then, after seven years of being in business, the company
has yet to achieve profitability, due in large part to the exorbitant legal expenses
required to lobby for and defend the legality of the company’s nascent industry. 2
Consequently, to help ensure the survival of the company, you do the
unthinkable—agree to merge with your bitter rival.3
This was the situation confronting FanDuel, a major daily fantasy sports
(“DFS”) company, in November 2016 when it announced an agreement to merge
with DraftKings (the “Merger”).4 Pending regulatory approval from the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”), the companies expected to
consummate the Merger by the end of 2017. 5 Ultimately, FanDuel and
DraftKings never received that approval. 6 Instead, the FTC elected to challenge
the Merger due to competition concerns. 7 As a result, in July 2017, FanDuel and
DraftKings decided to terminate their pursuit of a merger, rather than spend
1. See generally About, FANDUEL, https://www.fanduel.com/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2017) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the founding of FanDuel).
2. See Darren Heitner, How and Why FanDuel and DraftKings Decided to Merge, FORBES (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2016/11/18/how-and-why-fanduel-and-draftkings-decidedto-merge/#340fa7687c45 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (revealing that FanDuel
“spent almost $8 million in legal fees” during the fourth quarter of 2015).
3. See David Purdum, Planned Merger Between DraftKings, FanDuel Is Off, ESPN (July 14, 2017),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/20002903/in-abrupt-fashion-draftkings-fanduel-merger-off (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (questioning “whether both DraftKings and FanDuel can survive as
separate entities”).
4. Id.
5. Heitner, supra note 2.
6. Purdum, supra note 3.
7. Id.
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upwards of $15 million on another legal battle. 8
The FTC and some industry commentators view this result as “a major win
for daily fantasy sports consumers.” 9 This Comment, however, argues that
critical flaws in the FTC’s analysis not only led to an incorrect decision to
challenge the Merger, but also demonstrate the need to consider revising the
Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”). 10 The Guidelines
are the analytical framework the FTC uses to determine whether to challenge a
particular horizontal merger. 11 The FTC should revise the Guidelines because, as
the DraftKings and FanDuel experience reveals, the FTC may not be
accomplishing its “mission to protect consumers and promote competition” as
effectively as it otherwise could, which has far-reaching implications for
consumers and industries across the country. 12
Part II discusses the FTC’s authority to review horizontal mergers and the
Guidelines.13 Part III examines the administrative complaint the FTC filed
challenging the proposed Merger. 14 Part IV analyzes the critical flaws in the
FTC’s rationale for contesting the Merger, which led the FTC to unnecessarily
challenge the Merger.15 Finally, Part V offers potential revisions to the
Guidelines that will address the shortcomings of the current version of the
Guidelines.16 The Guidelines must be reevaluated in light of the FTC’s analytical
missteps with the Merger. 17
II. THE REFEREE AND RULEBOOK FOR REVIEWING HORIZONTAL MERGERS
Before discussing the particulars of the failed Merger, this Comment
explores the relevant regulatory framework for reviewing horizontal mergers in
the United States.18 Section A describes the FTC’s statutory authorization to

8. Id.
9. Marc Edelman, FTC Challenges Proposed DraftKings and FanDuel Merger: A Win for Daily Fantasy
Consumers, FORBES (June 19, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2017/06/19/ftc-challengesproposed-draftkings-and-fanduel-merger-a-win-for-daily-fantasy-consumers/#241e0acb4698 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Infra Parts IV–V.
11. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES]
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 7,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. Infra Part II.
14. Infra Part III.
15. Infra Part IV.
16. Infra Part V.
17. Infra Parts IV–V.
18. Infra Part II. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) also plays an
important role in “enforc[ing] the federal antitrust laws,” but, because the FTC handled the investigation into
the proposed Merger, this Comment does not address the DOJ’s role in reviewing mergers. The Enforcers, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last
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review horizontal mergers.19 Section B discusses the FTC’s Guidelines for
challenging a horizontal merger. 20
A. The Referee: The Federal Trade Commission’s Authority to Review
Horizontal Mergers
The FTC challenged the proposed Merger pursuant to the authority vested in
the FTC by the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC
Act”).21 The Clayton Act proscribes corporate acquisitions that are likely to result
in substantially less competitive markets. 22 The statute vests the authority to
enforce this provision in the FTC. 23 If the FTC determines that a proposed
merger is inconsistent with the Clayton Act and the merging companies refuse to
abandon the merger, the FTC may challenge the merger by “issu[ing] an
administrative complaint and/or seek[ing] injunctive relief in the federal
courts.”24
The FTC Act expands the Commission’s authority by allowing it “to address
acts or practices that are anticompetitive but may not fall within the scope of
the . . . Clayton Act.” 25 The FTC Act declares that “[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce” are unlawful, and empowers the FTC to
ensure corporations do not engage in such conduct. 26 If the Commission believes
a proposed merger would violate the FTC Act, it may initiate an administrative
adjudicatory action under the FTC Act. 27 The adjudicatory proceedings under the
FTC Act parallel the proceedings initiated under the Clayton Act. 28 Enforcing
these statutes helps the Commission achieve its goal of “ensur[ing] that
[American] markets are open and free” and “work[] according to consumer
preferences, not illegal practices.” 29

visited Nov. 7, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. Infra Part II.A.
20. Infra Part II.B.
21. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 45 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72).
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72).
24. The Enforcers, supra note 18.
25. Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of
Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 13, 2015), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1)–(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72).
27. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
28. Id.
29. What We Do, supra note 12.

84

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
B. The Rulebook: The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
The Guidelines reflect “the principal analytical techniques and the main
types of evidence on which the [FTC] usually rel[ies] to predict whether a
horizontal merger may substantially lessen competition.” 30 Thus, the Guidelines
are key to the FTC’s merger review process. 31 If, according to the Guidelines, a
merger is likely to substantially lessen competition, the FTC will almost certainly
challenge the merger. 32
This Section generally describes portions of the Guidelines that appeared
prominently in the FTC’s decision to challenge the Merger. 33 Subsection 1
discusses how the Guidelines approach product market definition and how this
affects the market concentration analysis. 34 Subsection 2 focuses on potential
anticompetitive effects mergers have on customers and industries. 35 Subsection 3
explores how market entry can mitigate a merger’s anticompetitive effects. 36
Finally, Subsection 4 explains how the FTC could be persuaded to approve a
merger if the merging firms can substantiate cognizable efficiencies that will
result from the merger. 37
1. Product Market Definition and Market Concentration
Defining the relevant product market is an important function of the
Guidelines because it “allows the [FTC] to identify market participants and
measure market shares and market concentration.” 38 The analysis concentrates on
demand substitution factors. 39 In other words, the analysis seeks to identify
“customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to
another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such
as a reduction in product quality or service.” 40 The FTC engages with customers
to ensure it properly defines the product market, as “[c]ustomers are typically the
best source . . . of critical information on the factors that govern their ability and

30. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1.
31. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TRANSCRIPT OF THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT 15
(Dec. 3, 2009), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/horizontal-mergerguidelines-review-project/091203transcript.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT TRANSCRIPT] (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Robert Pitofsky, former Chairman of the FTC, asserted the
Guidelines have “had the most important influence on American antitrust policy in the last 50 years.” Id.
32. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72).
33. Infra Part II.B.
34. Infra Part II.B.1.
35. Infra Part II.B.2.
36. Infra Part II.B.3.
37. Infra Part II.B.4.
38. See GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the important reasons behind market definition).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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willingness to substitute in the event of a price increase.” 41
The FTC applies the hypothetical monopolist test to accurately establish the
relevant product market. 42 This test “requires that a product market contain
enough substitute products so that it could be subject to post-merger exercise of
market power significantly exceeding that existing absent the merger.” 43 The test
safeguards against defining a relevant product market too narrowly. 44
Defining the relevant product market is important because it allows the FTC
to undertake a market concentration analysis. 45 The FTC’s calculation of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) often sheds light on a merger’s likely
competitive effects.46 The Commission calculates the HHI “by summing the
squares of the individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately
greater weight to the larger market shares.” 47 As part of this analysis, the FTC
“consider[s] both the post-merger level of market concentration and the change
in concentration resulting from a merger.” 48
In some instances, the HHI calculation carries significant weight. 49 If the
FTC concludes “the post-merger level of the HHI and the increase in the HHI
resulting from the merger” are sufficiently high, the FTC will declare the merger
to be presumptively illegal.50 Mergers that result in a post-merger HHI level
above 2,500 and “an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points” are
presumptively illegal. 51 Despite this presumption, the Guidelines state that “[t]he
purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate
competitively benign mergers from anticompetitive ones.” 52 Instead, the
Commission intends for the HHI calculation to be “one way to identify some
mergers unlikely to raise competitive concerns and some others for which it is
particularly important to examine whether other competitive factors confirm,
reinforce, or counteract the potentially harmful effects of increased
concentration.” 53 For these reasons, defining the product market and measuring
market concentration are critical aspects of the Guidelines.54
41. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
9 (2006), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/commentaryonthehoriz
ontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
42. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 8–9.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19.
50. Id.; Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.),
at *8.
51. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 19.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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2. Anticompetitive Effects
When two competing firms merge, “[t]he elimination of competition between
[them] that results from their merger may alone constitute a substantial lessening
of competition.” 55 The Guidelines term this result as a merger’s “unilateral
effects,” which can take various forms. 56 For example, a merger “may diminish
competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the price
of one or both products above the pre-merger level.” 57 Reduced competition also
may incentivize a “merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level
that would prevail in the absence of the merger.” 58 A merged firm, for example,
may have “reduced incentive to continue with an existing product-development
effort or reduced incentive to initiate development of new products.” 59 Finally, a
merger could lead to less product variety. 60 This lack of product variety could be
harmful to consumers if the merged firm removes products most consumers
strongly prefer to what would remain available in the marketplace. 61 If the FTC
believes any of these harmful unilateral effects are likely to result from a
merger’s substantial reduction in competition, the FTC will likely challenge the
merger.62
3. Market Entry
The Guidelines also recognize that “[t]he prospect of entry into the relevant
market will alleviate concerns about adverse competitive effects[, but] only if
such entry will deter or counteract any competitive effects of concern so the
merger will not substantially harm consumers.” 63 To determine if market entry
may counteract anticompetitive effects, the FTC analyzes the “timeliness,
likelihood, and sufficiency of the entry efforts an entrant might practically
employ.” 64 Entry is timely if it is “rapid enough that customers are not
significantly harmed by the merger, despite any anticompetitive harm that occurs
prior to the entry.” 65 The Guidelines also indicate that “[e]ntry is likely if it
would be profitable, accounting for the assets, capabilities, and capital needed
and the risks involved, including the need for the entrant to incur costs that would

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-72).
GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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not be recovered if the entrant later exits.” 66 Finally, entry is sufficient if it is
capable of counterbalancing a merger’s anticompetitive effects. 67
As part of its market entry analysis, the FTC “consider[s] the actual history
of entry into the relevant market and give[s] substantial weight to this
evidence.” 68 This history is important because a “[l]ack of successful and
effective entry in the face of non-transitory increases in the margins earned on
products in the relevant market tends to suggest that successful entry is slow or
difficult.”69 The Guidelines recognize that obtaining accurate and thorough
information may be extremely difficult and, therefore, “the [FTC] consider[s]
reasonably available and reliable evidence bearing on whether entry will satisfy
the conditions of timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency.”70
4. Efficiencies
Finally, the Guidelines recognize that mergers have the “potential to generate
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive
to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced
service, or new products.”71 While recognizing this potential, however, the
Guidelines assert that “[e]fficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify,” and
“credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects.” 72 The
Commission places the burden “upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency
claims so that [the Commission] can verify by reasonable means the likelihood
and magnitude of each asserted efficiency.” 73 Further, the merging firms must
demonstrate “how and when each [efficiency] would be achieved (and any costs
of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to
compete, and why each would be merger-specific.”74
In the end, the Guidelines play a key role in antitrust law enforcement. 75 Not
only do the Guidelines anchor the FTC’s merger analysis and enforcement, they
also serve the important purpose of “provid[ing] greater transparency and
foster[ing] deeper understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement.” 76 For
these reasons, the effectiveness of the FTC’s merger enforcement and the welfare
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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of American businesses and consumers hinge on the soundness of the
Guidelines.77
III. BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE DRAFTKINGS AND FANDUEL MERGER
On June 19, 2017, the Commission filed an administrative complaint to
challenge the Merger.78 The following Sections describe the FTC’s main reasons
for challenging the Merger. 79 Section A discusses how the FTC defined the
relevant product market DraftKings and FanDuel compete in. 80 Section B
explores the FTC’s finding that the Merger, if consummated, would have
significant anticompetitive effects. 81 Finally, Section C describes the
Commission’s determination that there were no countervailing factors to
convince the Commission to approve the Merger.82
A. Defining the Relevant Product Market
The FTC determined that paid DFS is “a distinct relevant product market”
and used this as support for its decision to challenge the Merger. 83 The
Commission reached this conclusion because it found important distinctions
between paid DFS and other types of fantasy sports, such as season long fantasy
sports (“SLFS”).84 For example, according to the FTC, DFS and SLFS are
different because DFS contests have a much shorter duration. 85 Additionally, the
two contests are different because “SLFS participants play primarily for social
reasons,” while the opportunity for financial gain motivates DFS participants. 86
Finally, DFS and SLFS generally have different contest sizes because, unlike
DFS contests, SLFS games do not allow an athlete to appear on multiple teams at
the same time. 87 For these reasons, the FTC concluded SLFS contests “are not
sufficiently substitutable to belong in a paid DFS relevant product market.” 88
Based on this conclusion, the FTC excluded SLFS from its market
77. Id.
78. Press Release, FTC and Two State Attorneys General Challenge Proposed Merger of the Two
Largest Daily Fantasy Sports Sites, DraftKings and FanDuel, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 19, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/06/ftc-two-state-attorneys-general-challenge-proposedmerger-two (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
79. Infra Part III.A–C.
80. Infra Part III.A.
81. Infra Part III.B.
82. Infra Part III.C.
83. Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at *5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *6.
88. Id. at *5.
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concentration analysis. 89 As a result, the Commission determined that the Merger
would lead to a highly concentrated DFS market. 90 The Commission calculated
that “the Merger would result in a post-Merger HHI of at least 8,100 and an
increase in concentration much greater than 200 points.” 91 These HHI levels
prompted the Commission to declare the Merger presumptively unlawful. 92
B. The Merger’s Anticompetitive Effects
The FTC also found that the Merger would have significant anticompetitive
effects.93 For example, the Commission believed approving the Merger would
result in “higher commission rates and lower promotional offers.” 94 According
to the Commission, this would occur because DraftKings currently serves as an
important constraint on FanDuel’s ability to raise prices, and vice versa. 95 The
FTC reasoned that this price competition would no longer exist after the Merger,
leading to higher prices for customers. 96
Additionally, the FTC contended the Merger would eliminate non-price
competition.97 As separate entities, DraftKings and FanDuel compete on nonprice factors such as contest size, product features, and sports offerings. 98 If the
FTC allowed the companies to merge, the merged company “would have
significantly less incentive to maintain and to improve the quality of its contest
offerings and user experience.”99 From the Commission’s perspective, this
reduction in product quality and incentive to innovate would harm consumers,
making this an important anticompetitive effect of the Merger. 100
C. Lack of Countervailing Factors
Finally, the Commission asserted there were no countervailing factors that
would counterbalance the Merger’s anticompetitive effects. 101 For example, the
FTC contended new entrants into the paid DFS market would be unlikely
because of significant barriers to entry, such as regulatory uncertainty and

89. Id.
90. Id. at *7.
91. Id. at *8.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *8–9.
94. Id. at *8.
95. Id. at *9.
96. Id. at *10.
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id. at *10.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *12.
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compliance costs.102 Additionally, the FTC found that the Merger created no
cognizable efficiencies “that rebut the strong presumption and evidence that the
Merger likely would substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.” 103
The FTC also concluded neither DraftKings nor FanDuel is in danger of going
out of business, which would have militated in favor of approving the Merger. 104
Because the Commission found no factors that would counteract the Merger’s
significant anticompetitive effects, it filed an administrative complaint to
challenge the Merger. 105
IV. REVIEWING THE CALL ON THE COURT: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
ANALYTICAL MISSTEPS
The FTC insists it is protecting American consumers by challenging the
Merger, and some industry experts have commended the FTC for its actions. 106
After further review, there are numerous flaws in the Commission’s analysis of
the Merger.107 These flaws played an important role in the FTC’s decision to
challenge the Merger, and analyzing them reveals the FTC should not have
challenged the Merger. 108 Section A argues the FTC mischaracterized the
relevant product market, leading it to overstate the Merger’s anticompetitive
effects and incorrectly apply the presumption of illegality. 109 Section B describes
the important countervailing factors the FTC dismissed when analyzing the
Merger.110
A. Mischaracterizing the Relevant Product Market
The FTC determined the differences between DFS and SLFS are sufficient to
make paid DFS “a distinct relevant product market.” 111 With the exclusion of
SLFS, the Commission mischaracterized the relevant product market because the
differences between the two are not as significant as the Commission asserts. 112
First, the FTC contends the markets are different because DFS players primarily

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at *13.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Edelman, supra note 9.
Infra Part IV.A–B.
Infra Part IV.A–B.
Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Part IV.B.
Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at

*5.
112. FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, ONE-DAY VS. SEASON-LONG FANTASY PLAYERS: IS THERE
DIFFERENCE? 10 (2015), available at http://www.fstaconference.com/docs/09-McClain-EgglesDemographics.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
A
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participate to win money, while SLFS users play to interact with friends. 113 This
argument distinguishes between the markets by overstating the importance of
financial gain to DFS players and understating the importance to SLFS users. 114
Industry data demonstrates the opportunity for financial gain is not the primary
motivation for most DFS players. 115 In one study, for example, only 13.3% of
DFS players stated profit is the main reason for playing DFS. 116 Rather than
profit, many DFS players reported excitement, competition, and strategy as being
primary motivators for engaging in DFS. 117
Industry data also demonstrates that the FTC overlooked the importance of
financial gain to SLFS users. 118 For example, 43% of SLFS players list financial
gain as one of the reasons for playing SLFS. 119 Additionally, industry data from
2016 reveals that the average SLFS player spent $184 on SLFS over a one-year
period.120 While this trails the $318 an average DFS player spent on his or her
games over the same time period, the spending on SLFS and motivation to win
money are not insignificant. 121 Thus, the DFS and SLFS markets are more similar
than different because the opportunity for financial gain is an important
motivation for players in both markets. 122
Additionally, the Commission insisted that the DFS and SLFS markets are
distinct because not many DFS players are interested in playing SLFS. 123
According to the FTC, “most DFS users are not likely to turn to SLFS as a
substitute product in response to a small but significant price increase.”124 Once
again, industry data refutes this claim. 125 An industry study found 82.8% of DFS
users also play traditional SLFS, meaning the two contests frequently compete
for the same consumers. 126 As a result, SLFS and DFS consumers are not as
different as the Commission argues. 127
The companies’ decisions to begin offering games that closely resemble
traditional SLFS offerings further complicate the decision to label DraftKings

113. Complaint, supra note 50, at *5.
114. FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, supra note 112, at 10, 12.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 10.
119. Id.
120. Industry Demographics, FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASS’N, https://fsta.org/research/industrydemographics/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
121. Id.
122. FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, supra note 112, at 10.
123. Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at
*6.
124. Id. at *7.
125. FANTASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOCIATION, supra note 112, at 10.
126. Id. at 9.
127. Id. at 10.

92

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
and FanDuel as pure DFS providers. 128 Since 2016, DraftKings and FanDuel
have offered “Leagues” and “Friends Mode,” respectively. 129 These features
“give[] users the ability to play against a single group of friends all season long”
and demonstrate a clear “foray into the . . . season-long market.”130 Because
DraftKings and FanDuel both offer competitions that directly compete with
traditional SLFS, the argument that these companies operate in a separate DFS
market loses force. 131
In the end, the differences between DFS and SLFS are not as drastic as the
FTC suggests.132 Therefore, the Commission erred when it concluded SLFS are
not a part of the DFS market for merger analysis purposes. 133 As a result of this
mistake, the FTC defined the relevant product market too narrowly. 134 This led
the FTC to incorrectly conclude the Merger would result in a highly concentrated
market, triggering the presumption of illegality. 135 This critical mistake is
evidence that the Guidelines are implicating mergers that should be left
unchallenged, which means the Guidelines are not serving their purpose and need
to be revised.136
B. Dismissing Important Countervailing Factors
The Commission also ignored significant countervailing factors that militate
against challenging the Merger. 137 Subsection 1 explains how the Merger would
have eliminated regulatory uncertainty in the DFS industry, thereby making entry
into the market more likely. 138 Subsection 2 describes how the Merger would
have generated significant cost-saving efficiencies consumers likely would have
benefitted from. 139
1. The Merger Would Have Eliminated the Regulatory Uncertainty Barrier
to Entry
The FTC found entry into the DFS market would not “be timely, likely, and
128. Daniel Roberts, DraftKings, FanDuel, Yahoo Dip Their Toes into Season-Long Fantasy Sports,
YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 14, 2016), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/draftkings-leagues-fanduel-dfs-daily000000742.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at
*6.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Heitner, supra note 2.
138. Infra Part IV.B.1.
139. Infra Part IV.B.2.
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sufficient to offset the anticompetitive effects of the Merger.” 140 The FTC
reasoned that high regulatory compliance costs and significant regulatory
uncertainty in the industry made market entry an inadequate offset. 141 As a
consequence of blocking the Merger, however, the FTC entrenched uncertainty
in the DFS industry because DraftKings and FanDuel cannot effectively
collaborate on lobbying for industry regulations as separate entities. 142 Without
synergy and collaboration between these companies on this issue, alleviating the
regulatory uncertainty in the industry becomes much less likely, which
discourages prospective firms from entering the market. 143
On the other hand, if the Commission had approved the Merger, it would
have helped eliminate the industry’s regulatory uncertainty, thereby increasing
the likelihood of market entry and fostering a more competitive environment. 144
The Merger would have created a more stable regulatory environment because
the merged firm would be able to “work more efficiently and economically with
state government officials to develop a standard regulatory framework for the
industry.” 145 The major motivations behind the proposed Merger were reducing
compliance costs and creating a consistent regulatory framework, so eliminating
regulatory uncertainty would have been a likely result of the Merger. 146
Finalizing a regulatory framework would have reduced the legal and lobbying
expenses that have had a debilitating effect on each company’s bottom line. 147
Assuming a merged DraftKings and FanDuel would accomplish its goal of
eliminating regulatory uncertainty and reducing compliance costs, all other firms
in the DFS market would benefit from a more stable and attractive regulatory
environment.148 This attractive environment would encourage prospective firms
to enter the industry, creating a more competitive marketplace.149 The FTC
ensured hostility to market entrants by blocking the Merger, whereas approving
the Merger would have fostered a more competitive environment by eliminating
the most significant barrier to entry. 150
140. Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at
*13.
141. Id.
142. Heitner, supra note 2; Purdum, supra note 3.
143. A Merger Borne of Weakness, ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/blogs/gam
etheory/2016/11/daily-fantasy-sports (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
144. Id.
145. Heitner, supra note 2.
146. Id.; see also Erin Griffith, 5 Things to Know About the Failed FanDuel-DraftKings Merger,
FORTUNE (July 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/14/5-things-to-know-about-the-failed-fanduel-draftkingsmerger/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (elaborating on the uncertainty both DraftKings
and FanDuel face after terminating the Merger).
147. Heitner, supra note 2; see also Griffith, supra note 146.
148. Heitner, supra note 2; see also Griffith, supra note 146 (explaining that the Merger “was supposed
to reduce the amount of resources the companies were spending on regulatory issues”).
149. Heitner, supra note 2.
150. Id.; Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017 WL 3049123 (F.T.C.),
at *14.
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2. The Merger Would Have Created Cost-Saving Efficiencies
The FTC also contended there were no cognizable efficiencies that would
counterbalance the Merger’s anticompetitive effects. 151 However, a merged
DraftKings and FanDuel would likely enjoy enormous cost savings, which is a
significant efficiency. 152 As separate entities, DraftKings and FanDuel are
“doubling the resources spent on legal battles” and advertising. 153 For example,
in 2015, DraftKings and FanDuel spent a combined $500 million on
advertising.154 While both companies have reduced their advertising budgets
since, the Merger would have allowed the combined company to decrease
advertising expenditures even further. 155 Similarly, as separate firms, DraftKings
and FanDuel have redundant legal and lobbying expenses. 156 A merged company
would eliminate redundant costs and allow for more efficient work with
government officials.157
DraftKings and FanDuel ultimately pass their significant advertising and
legal costs on to consumers. 158 Therefore, consumers would likely benefit from
the merged firm’s ability to reduce costs.159 The merged company may try to
retain all cost savings to increase profits, but some benefits would likely extend
to consumers as well. 160 For example, cost savings could benefit consumers by
making DFS contests cheaper for players. 161 Additionally, the increased
likelihood of market entry after the Merger could incentivize the merged
company to invest its cost savings in product innovation. 162

151. Id.
152. Griffith, supra note 146; see also Heitner, supra note 2 (describing cost savings associated with
increased efficiency and the ability to be more sustainable if the companies merged). See generally Diane Bartz,
FanDuel, DraftKings Scrap Troubled Merger, REUTERS (July 13, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usfanduel-m-a-draftkings/fanduel-draftkings-scrap-troubled-merger-idUSKBN19Y2KL (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (determining that without the merged companies, each individual
company will have to spend to compete with one another).
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154. Alexandra Berzon, Fantasy-Sports Sites Curtail Ad Spending, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://w
ww.wsj.com/articles/fantasy-sports-rivals-slice-ad-spending-1470052800 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
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156. Griffith, supra note 146; Bartz, supra note 152.
157. Heitner, supra note 2; see also Bartz, supra note 152 (explaining that a purpose of the Merger was
to reduce redundant costs).
158. Griffith, supra note 146.
159. Statement from FanDuel CEO Nigel Eccles on Termination of Merger, FAN DUEL (July 13, 2017),
https://newsroom.fanduel.com/2017/07/13/statement-from-fanduel-ceo-nigel-eccles-on-termination-of-merger/
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
160. Timothy J. Muris & Bilal Sayyed, Three Key Principles for Revising the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, ANTITRUST SOURCE 7 (Apr. 2010), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publ
ishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_Muris4_14f.authcheckdam.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
161. Griffith, supra note 146; see also Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 7.
162. See Statement from FanDuel CEO Nigel Eccles on Termination of Merger, supra note 159
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Thus, the Commission appears to have ignored a significant efficiency that
would counteract the anticompetitive effects of the Merger by dismissing the
Merger’s ability to reduce fixed costs. 163 Rather than leading to higher prices and
reduced innovation, the Merger likely would have benefitted consumers because
the merged firm could have realized hundreds of millions of dollars in cost
savings.164
V. CHANGING THE GAME: REVISING THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
The numerous missteps in the FTC’s analysis of the Merger indicate the
necessity of revising the Guidelines. 165 Revisions will help the FTC more
effectively carry out its mandate to ensure markets remain competitive, enforce
antitrust laws, and promote consumer welfare. 166 Further, these revisions will
help prevent the Commission from unnecessarily challenging harmless merger
proposals in the future. 167 Section A proposes leveling the burden of proof for
merger efficiencies.168 Section B suggests the Guidelines should acknowledge
that consumers benefit from a merged firm’s fixed cost savings. 169 Section C
recommends removing innovation from the competitive effects analysis.170
Section D advocates eliminating the presumption of illegality from the
Guidelines.171
A. Leveling the Burden of Proof for Merger Efficiency Claims
One way to improve the effectiveness of the Guidelines is to level the burden
of proof for merger efficiency claims.172 Currently, the Guidelines do not provide
for a difference between the burden of proof required to establish efficiency
claims or anticompetitive effects. 173 In reality, however, the Commission’s
“investigating attorneys appear more skeptical of efficiency claims than they do

(expecting benefits to customers through increased investment in growth and product development).
163. Griffith, supra note 146.
164. See Berzon, supra note 154 (describing DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s spending of millions of dollars
in competition, leading to operating losses for both companies); see also Griffith, supra note 146 (explaining
that after the Merger, reducing costs would lower prices for customers).
165. See Press Release, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Issue Revised Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-andfederal-trade-commission-issue-revised-horizontal-merger-guidelines (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (introducing techniques and methods to assess the effects of horizontal mergers).
166. Id.; What We Do, supra note 12.
167. Press Release, supra note 165.
168. Infra Part V.A.
169. Infra Part V.B.
170. Infra Part V.C.
171. Infra Part V.D.
172. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 7.
173. Id.
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of potential anticompetitive effect claims.” 174 Additionally, the Guidelines
require merging firms to prove efficiency claims in great detail. 175 In contrast, the
FTC does not have to precisely substantiate anticompetitive effects because the
Guidelines state “that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom
possible.” 176 This distinction implicitly suggests there is a higher burden of proof
for efficiency claims. 177
The FTC should revise its Guidelines to “explicitly reject different burdens
of proof for procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.” 178 Doing so would
promote more consistent application of the Guidelines and encourage the
Commission to more seriously consider efficiency claims, rather than quickly
and skeptically dismiss them.179
B. Acknowledging Fixed Cost Reductions Benefit Consumers
The FTC should also revise the Guidelines to more fully address fixed cost
savings as cognizable efficiencies consumers benefit from. 180 Currently, the FTC
limits its discussion of fixed cost savings as efficiencies to a skeptical footnote in
the Guidelines.181 The Merger would have resulted in considerable savings on
advertising and legal expenses, yet the FTC did not recognize the savings as a
cognizable efficiency in its complaint. 182 The Commission likely did not
recognize the cost savings as a cognizable efficiency because the Guidelines
currently state that “[e]fficiencies relating to costs that are fixed in the short term
are unlikely to benefit customers in the short term.” 183 The FTC “normally
give[s] the most weight to the results . . . over the short term.” 184 Many
companies, however, establish their price structures using their total costs, which
include fixed costs. 185 This means that when fixed costs decrease for these
companies, prices will as well.186 As a result, the FTC should reconsider its
position in the Guidelines that efficiency claims based on fixed costs savings are
not entitled to much weight. 187
174. Id.
175. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 30.
176. Id. at 1.
177. Id. at 1, 30.
178. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 7.
179. See id. (concluding that the application of a uniform burden of proof would result in consistency).
180. Id. at 6.
181. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 31.
182. Griffith, supra note 146; Complaint, DraftKings, Inc. (dismissed July 14, 2017) (No. 9375), 2017
WL 3049123 (F.T.C.), at *14.
183. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 31.
184. Id.
185. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 7.
186. Id.
187. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 31; see also Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 9 (suggesting
methods to revise Guidelines).
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Even if there are few industry competitors remaining after a merger, a
merged firm is still likely to pass some of its fixed cost savings along to
consumers.188 Therefore, concerns that a concentrated marketplace will prevent
consumers from enjoying lower prices generated by a merged firm’s fixed cost
savings should not keep the FTC from adopting this revision. 189
Adopting this revision would better align the Guidelines with the
Commission’s actual practices. 190 In practice, the FTC is “as likely to accept
fixed-cost savings as [it is] to accept claims of variable-cost savings.”191 This
demonstrates a significant disconnect between the Guidelines and actual FTC
practices.192 Because of this disconnect, discerning how the FTC will evaluate the
fixed cost savings that result from a merger becomes much more difficult. 193
When such a disconnect exists, the Guidelines cease to achieve one of their
primary goals—providing transparent FTC antitrust enforcement. 194 For these
reasons, the FTC should more receptively address claims of fixed cost savings as
cognizable efficiencies by revising the Guidelines. 195
C. Removing the Effect on Innovation from the Competitive Effects Analysis
Removing the innovation analysis could also increase the Guidelines’
effectiveness.196 Currently, the Guidelines recognize that reduced innovation
could be an anticompetitive effect of a merger and that increased innovation
could also be an efficiency resulting from a merger. 197 Determining a merger’s
effect on innovation can be extremely difficult because “the competitioninnovation link is neither settled nor supportive of a causal relationship between
the number of firms and amount of (successful) innovation.” 198 It is unclear how
an industry’s competitive environment affects a firm’s ability and incentive to
innovate.199
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. MALCOM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC ISSUES: MERGER
EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1997–2007 vi (2009), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/merger-efficiencies-federal-trade-commission-1997–
2007/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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192. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 31 (describing unpredictable results due to difficulties with
verification), with COATE & HEIMERT, supra note 190, at vi (explaining the Bureau of Competition’s and the
Bureau of Economics’ results in evaluating efficiency claims).
193. Compare GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 31 (describing unpredictable results due to difficulties with
verification), with COATE & HEIMERT, supra note 190, at vi (explaining the Bureau of Competition’s and the
Bureau of Economics’ results in evaluating efficiency claims).
194. GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 1.
195. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 6.
196. Id. at 12.
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198. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 160, at 12.
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Further, the FTC lacks experience with evaluating innovation. 200 The
experience the FTC does have “derive[s] from investigations of mergers in the
pharmaceutical industry,” which may not be helpful when analyzing a merger’s
effect on innovation in other industries. 201 With the limited knowledge of a
merger’s effect on innovation and the Commission’s inexperience with analyzing
innovation, the Commission should revise the Guidelines to remove the
innovation analysis.202
D. Eliminating the Presumption of Illegality
Finally, eliminating the presumption of illegality for mergers reaching
specific HHI thresholds could help the Guidelines become more effective and
transparent.203 The presumption of illegality is problematic for multiple
reasons.204 First, HHI scores derive directly from product market definition. 205
The powerful effect of a presumption of illegality thus forces the merging parties
and the FTC to dedicate too much effort to defining the relevant product
market.206 As a result, the merging parties and the FTC may lose focus on
analyzing other specific circumstances that shed light on a particular merger’s
likely competitive effects. 207 The presumption of illegality has a significant
unintended consequence of distorting the breadth and depth of merger analysis. 208
Additionally, similar to efficiency claims for fixed cost savings, the
Commission’s practice regarding the presumption of illegality has not always
aligned with the Guidelines. 209 This divergence between agency practice and the
Guidelines leads to confusion for businesses and makes the Guidelines less
transparent.210 Therefore, removing the presumption of illegality from the
Guidelines and agency practice will improve consistency and provide greater
clarity to merging companies. 211
Further, the presumption of illegality compounds the burden of proof
problem that permeates the Guidelines. 212 Already having the burden to prove
merger efficiencies in great detail, merging parties must rebut the presumption of
unpredictable results).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See id. (discouraging the inclusion of innovation in the Guidelines).
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illegality “by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance
market power.”213 As a result, after the FTC proves that a merger would reach the
appropriate HHI thresholds, the merging parties have the burden to prove the
merger’s efficiencies and disprove its anticompetitive effects. 214 The presumption
of illegality places an enormous burden on the merging parties.215
In the end, the Commission should revise the Guidelines to eliminate the
presumption of illegality when mergers reach certain HHI levels. 216 The
Guidelines should only indicate that when a merger attains a particular HHI
threshold, the FTC will engage in a more detailed investigation into the merger’s
likely competitive effects. 217 Such a revision will ensure the Commission engages
in “a more direct analysis of likely competitive effects” that could result from a
merger.218 Even with this revision, the HHI can continue “provid[ing] substantial
guidance as highly useful screens.”219
VI. CONCLUSION
The FTC’s decision to challenge the DraftKings and FanDuel merger directly
impacts roughly three million active players on these sites and leaves the future
of these companies and the DFS industry in doubt. 220 Ultimately, one of these
companies may go out of business, which would produce the exact monopoly in
the DFS industry the Commission argued it avoided creating by challenging the
Merger.221 Consumers should have significant concerns about their ability to
enjoy DFS games in the future. 222
The implications of the Commission’s decision to block the Merger extend
far beyond the DFS industry. 223 If the current version of the Guidelines led the
FTC to unnecessarily block the Merger, the Guidelines could likewise direct the
FTC to needlessly challenge other mergers in the future. 224 When the
Commission challenges mergers it should actually approve, the Commission is
not effectively carrying out the mandates established in the FTC Act and the
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Clayton Act.225 Instead, the FTC causes the exact harm these laws entrust the
FTC to prevent. 226
For these reasons, the failed DraftKings and FanDuel merger is an important
signal that it is time to revise the Guidelines once again.227 Simple revisions like
leveling the burden of proof for the FTC and merging parties and eliminating the
presumption of illegality can make the Guidelines and antitrust enforcement
more effective. 228 Similarly, removing innovation from the competitive effects
analysis and fully recognizing fixed cost savings as a cognizable efficiency can
improve the Guidelines. 229 By taking these steps, the Commission can ensure it is
protecting consumers, being transparent with businesses, and minimizing its
interference with mergers that will not harm, but may in fact benefit,
consumers.230
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